Paper 2013/871

A Unified Security Model of Authenticated Key Exchange with Specific Adversarial Capabilities

Weiqiang Wen, Libin Wang, and Jiaxin Pan

Abstract

The most widely accepted models in the security proofs of Authenticated Key Exchange protocols are the Canetti-Krawczyk and extended Canetti-Krawczyk models that admit different adversarial queries with ambiguities and incomparable strength. It is desirable to incorporate specific and powerful adversarial queries into a single unified security model and establish a more practical-oriented security notion. Concerning the security of one-round implicitly authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols, we present a unified security model that has many advantages over the previous ones. In the model, a system environment is set up, all of adversarial queries are practically interpreted and definitely characterized through physical environment, and some rigorous rules of secret leakage are also specified. To demonstrate usability of our model, a new protocol based on the OAKE protocol is proposed, which satisfies the presented strong security notion and attains high efficiency. The protocol is proven secure in random oracle model under gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.IET Information Security
Keywords
Authenticated Key ExchangeProvable SecuritySecurity Model
Contact author(s)
lbwang @ scnu edu cn
History
2016-03-13: last of 7 revisions
2013-12-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/871
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/871,
      author = {Weiqiang Wen and Libin Wang and Jiaxin Pan},
      title = {A Unified Security Model of Authenticated Key Exchange with Specific Adversarial Capabilities},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/871},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/871}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/871}
}
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