Paper 2013/869

How to Fake Auxiliary Input

Dimitar Jetchev and Krzysztof Pietrzak


Consider a joint distribution $(X,A)$ on a set ${\cal X}\times\{0,1\}^\ell$. We show that for any family ${\cal F}$ of distinguishers $f \colon {\cal X} \times \{0,1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, there exists a simulator $h \colon {\cal X} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$ such that \begin{enumerate} \item no function in ${\cal F}$ can distinguish $(X,A)$ from $(X,h(X))$ with advantage $\epsilon$, \item $h$ is only $O(2^{3\ell}\epsilon^{-2})$ times less efficient than the functions in ${\cal F}$. \end{enumerate} For the most interesting settings of the parameters (in particular, the cryptographic case where $X$ has superlogarithmic min-entropy, $\epsilon > 0$ is negligible and ${\cal F}$ consists of circuits of polynomial size), we can make the simulator $h$ \emph{deterministic}. As an illustrative application of this theorem, we give a new security proof for the leakage-resilient stream-cipher from Eurocrypt'09. Our proof is simpler and quantitatively much better than the original proof using the dense model theorem, giving meaningful security guarantees if instantiated with a standard blockcipher like AES. Subsequent to this work, Chung, Lui and Pass gave an interactive variant of our main theorem, and used it to investigate weak notions of Zero-Knowledge. Vadhan and Zheng give a more constructive version of our theorem using their new uniform min-max theorem.

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Publication info
Published by the IACR in TCC 2014
Contact author(s)
krzpie @ gmail com
2013-12-29: received
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      author = {Dimitar Jetchev and Krzysztof Pietrzak},
      title = {How to Fake Auxiliary Input},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/869},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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