Paper 2013/849
Pushing the Limit of Non-Profiling DPA using Multivariate Leakage Model
Suvadeep Hajra and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
Abstract
Profiling power attacks like Template attack and Stochastic attack optimize their performance by jointly evaluating the leakages of multiple sample points. However, such multivariate approaches are rare among non-profiling Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks, since integration of the leakage of a higher SNR sample point with the leakage of lower SNR sample point might result in a decrease in the overall performance. One of the few successful multivariate approaches is the application of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for non-profiling DPA. However, PCA also performs sub-optimally in the presence of high noise. In this paper, a multivariate model for an FPGA platform is introduced for improving the performances of non-profiling DPA attacks. The introduction of the proposed model greatly increases the success rate of DPA attacks in the presence of high noise. The experimental results on both simulated power traces and real power traces are also provided as an evidence.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. INSCRYPT 2013
- Keywords
- Differential Power Attack (DPA)Correlation Power Attack (CPA)leakage modelmultivariate leakage modelnon-profiling attackmultivariate distinguishermultivariate DPA.
- Contact author(s)
- suvadeep hajra @ gmail com
- History
- 2013-12-17: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/849
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/849,
author = {Suvadeep Hajra and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay},
title = {Pushing the Limit of Non-Profiling {DPA} using Multivariate Leakage Model},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/849},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/849}
}
