Paper 2013/807

Distributed Key Generation for Secure Encrypted Deduplication

Yitao Duan

Abstract

Large-scale storage systems often attempt to achieve two seemingly conflicting goals: (1) the systems need to reduce the copies of redundant data to save space, a process called deduplication; and (2) users demand encryption of their data to ensure privacy. Conventional encryption makes deduplication on ciphertexts ineffective, as it destroys data redundancy. A line of work, originated from Convergent Encryption [28], and evolved into Message Locked Encryption [12], strives to solve this problem. The latest work, DupLESS [11], proposes a server-aided architecture that provides the strongest privacy. The DupLESS architecture relies on a key server to help the clients generate encryption keys that result in convergent ciphertexts. In this paper, we first provide a rigorous proof of security, in the random oracle model, for the DupLESS architecture which is lacking in the original paper. Our proof shows that using additional secret, other than the data itself, for generating encryption keys achieves the best possible security under current deduplication paradigm.We then introduce a distributed protocol that eliminates the need for a key server and allows less managed systems such as P2P systems to enjoy the high security level. Implementation and evaluation show that the scheme is both robust and practical.

Note: Fixed a minor error about the definition of duplication oracle in section 6.3.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
oldsky @ gmail com
History
2014-02-24: revised
2013-12-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/807
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/807,
      author = {Yitao Duan},
      title = {Distributed Key Generation for Secure Encrypted Deduplication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/807},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/807}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.