Paper 2013/770

Efficient Template Attacks

Omar Choudary and Markus G. Kuhn

Abstract

Template attacks remain a powerful side-channel technique to eavesdrop on tamper-resistant hardware. They model the probability distribution of leaking signals and noise to guide a search for secret data values. In practice, several numerical obstacles can arise when implementing such attacks with multivariate normal distributions. We propose efficient methods to avoid these. We also demonstrate how to achieve significant performance improvements, both in terms of information extracted and computational cost, by pooling covariance estimates across all data values. We provide a detailed and systematic overview of many different options for implementing such attacks. Our experimental evaluation of all these methods based on measuring the supply current of a byte-load instruction executed in an unprotected 8-bit microcontroller leads to practical guidance for choosing an attack algorithm.

Note: Updated version, including conclusions section which was missing in the previous submission.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.CARDIS 2013
Keywords
side-channel analysistemplate attackfair evaluation
Contact author(s)
omar choudary @ cl cam ac uk
History
2015-11-10: last of 3 revisions
2013-11-25: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/770
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/770,
      author = {Omar Choudary and Markus G.  Kuhn},
      title = {Efficient Template Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/770},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/770}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/770}
}
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