Paper 2013/735

Masking Tables---An Underestimated Security Risk

Michael Tunstall, Carolyn Whitnall, and Elisabeth Oswald

Abstract

The literature on side-channel analysis describes numerous masking schemes designed to protect block ciphers at the implementation level. Such masking schemes typically require the computation of masked tables prior to the execution of an encryption function. In this paper we revisit an attack which directly exploits this computation in such a way as to recover all or some of the masks used. We show that securely implementing masking schemes is only possible where one has access to a significant amount of random numbers.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published by the IACR in Fse 2013
Keywords
Side-channel analysissecure implementationsblock ciphers
Contact author(s)
mike tunstall @ yahoo co uk
History
2013-11-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/735
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/735,
      author = {Michael Tunstall and Carolyn Whitnall and Elisabeth Oswald},
      title = {Masking Tables---An Underestimated Security Risk},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/735},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/735}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/735}
}
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