Paper 2013/522

The Resistance of PRESENT-80 Against Related-Key Differential Attacks

Sareh Emami, San Ling, Ivica Nikolic, Josef Pieprzyk, and Huaxiong Wang


We examine the security of the 64-bit lightweight block cipher PRESENT-80 against related-key differential attacks. With a computer search we are able to prove that no related-key differential characteristic exists with probability higher than $2^{-64}$ for the full-round PRESENT-80. To overcome the exponential (in the state and key sizes) computational complexity we use truncated differences, however as the key schedule is not nibble oriented, we switch to actual differences and apply early abort techniques to prune the tree-based search. With a new method called extended split approach we are able to make the whole search feasible and we implement and run it in real time. Our approach targets the PRESENT-80 cipher however, with small modifications can be reused for other lightweight ciphers as well.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
inikolic @ ntu edu sg
2013-10-28: last of 2 revisions
2013-08-30: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Sareh Emami and San Ling and Ivica Nikolic and Josef Pieprzyk and Huaxiong Wang},
      title = {The Resistance of PRESENT-80 Against Related-Key Differential Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/522},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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