Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/518

Universal Leaky Random Oracle Model

Guangjun Fan and Yongbin Zhou and Dengguo Feng

Abstract: K. Yoneyama et al. introduces the Leaky Random Oracle Model at ProvSec2008, which only considers the leakage of the hash list of a hash function used by a cryptosystem due to various attacks caused by implementation or sloppy usages. However, an important fact is that such attacks not only leak the hash list of a hash function, but also leak other secret states outside the hash list of a cryptosystem (e.g. the secret key). In most cases, an adversary may be more interesting in revealing these secret states. Therefore, the Leaky Random Oracle Model is very limited because it only considers the leakage of the hash list and does not consider the leakage of other secret states. In this paper, we present a new leakage model based on the Leaky Random Oracle Model. In our new model, both the secret states (secret key) and the hash list can be leaked. Furthermore, the secret key can be leaked continually. Hence, our new model is more universal and stronger than the Leaky Random Oracle Model and some other leakage models. Furthermore, we give a provable security public key encryption scheme which is IND-CCA secure in our new model.

Category / Keywords: leaky random oracle model, secret key, hash list, Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem, leakage

Date: received 20 Aug 2013, last revised 21 Aug 2013, withdrawn 21 Aug 2013

Contact author: guangjunfan at 163 com

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20130822:024408 (All versions of this report)

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