Paper 2013/479
Security analysis of Quantum-Readout PUFs in the case of challenge-estimation attacks
B. Skoric
Abstract
Quantum Readout PUFs (QR-PUFs) have been proposed as a technique for remote authentication of ob jects. The security is based on basic quantum information theoretic principles and the assumption that the adversary cannot losslessly implement arbitrary unitary transformations on a K-dimensional state space, with K "large". We consider all possible attacks in which the adversary bases his response on challenge state estimation by measurements. We first analyze the security of QR-PUF schemes in the case where each challenge consists of precisely n identical quanta. We use a result by Bruss and Macchiavello to derive an upper bound on the adversary’s success probability as a function of K and n. Then we generalize to challenges that contain a probabilistic number of quanta, and in particular a Poisson distribution.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- PUFquantum security
- Contact author(s)
- b skoric @ tue nl
- History
- 2014-01-27: last of 2 revisions
- 2013-08-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/479
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/479,
author = {B. Skoric},
title = {Security analysis of Quantum-Readout {PUFs} in the case of challenge-estimation attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/479},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/479}
}
