Paper 2013/479

Security analysis of Quantum-Readout PUFs in the case of challenge-estimation attacks

B. Skoric


Quantum Readout PUFs (QR-PUFs) have been proposed as a technique for remote authentication of ob jects. The security is based on basic quantum information theoretic principles and the assumption that the adversary cannot losslessly implement arbitrary unitary transformations on a K-dimensional state space, with K "large". We consider all possible attacks in which the adversary bases his response on challenge state estimation by measurements. We first analyze the security of QR-PUF schemes in the case where each challenge consists of precisely n identical quanta. We use a result by Bruss and Macchiavello to derive an upper bound on the adversary’s success probability as a function of K and n. Then we generalize to challenges that contain a probabilistic number of quanta, and in particular a Poisson distribution.

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Preprint. MINOR revision.
PUFquantum security
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b skoric @ tue nl
2014-01-27: last of 2 revisions
2013-08-14: received
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      author = {B.  Skoric},
      title = {Security analysis of Quantum-Readout PUFs in the case of challenge-estimation attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/479},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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