A note on quantum related-key attacks

Martin Roetteler; Rainer Steinwandt

Paper 2013/378

A note on quantum related-key attacks

Martin Roetteler and Rainer Steinwandt

Abstract

In a basic related-key attack against a block cipher, the adversary has access to encryptions under keys that differ from the target key by bit-flips. In this short note we show that for a quantum adversary such attacks are quite powerful: if the secret key is (i) uniquely determined by a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, (ii) the block cipher can be evaluated efficiently, and (iii) a superposition of related keys can be queried, then the key can be extracted efficiently.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. arXiv:1306.2301 [quant-ph]
Keywords: quantum computing related-key attack
Contact author(s): rsteinwa @ fau edu
History: 2013-06-12: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2013/378
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/378,
      author = {Martin Roetteler and Rainer Steinwandt},
      title = {A note on quantum related-key attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/378},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/378}
}