Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/327

A Lightweight Hash Function Resisting Birthday Attack and Meet-in-the-middle Attack

Shenghui Su and Tao Xie and Shuwang Lü

Abstract: To examine the integrity and authenticity of an IP address efficiently and economically, this paper proposes a new non-Merkle-Damgard structural (non-MDS) hash function called JUNA that is based on a multivariate permutation problem and an anomalous subset product problem to which no subexponential time solutions are found so far. JUNA includes an initialization algorithm and a compression algorithm, and converts a short message of n bits which is regarded as only one block into a digest of m bits, where 80 <= m <= 232 and 80 <= m <= n <= 4096. The analysis and proof show that the new hash is one-way, weakly collision-free, and strongly collision-free, and its security against existent attacks such as birthday attack and meet-in-the- middle attack is to O(2 ^ m). Moreover, a detailed proof that the new hash function is resistant to the birthday attack is given. Compared with the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash based on a discrete logarithm problem, the new hash is lightweight, and thus it opens a door to convenience for utilization of lightweight digital signing schemes.

Category / Keywords: Hash function; Compression algorithm; Merkle-Damgard structure; Provable security; Birthday attack; Meet-in-the- middle attack

Original Publication (with minor differences): Theoretical Computer Science, v654, Nov 2016, pp.128-142.

Date: received 28 May 2013, last revised 29 Apr 2017

Contact author: reesse at 126 com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: The content has no essential change.

Version: 20170430:035045 (All versions of this report)

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