MinimaLT: Minimal-latency Networking Through Better Security

W.  Michael Petullo; Xu Zhang; Jon A.  Solworth; Daniel J.  Bernstein; Tanja Lange

Paper 2013/310

MinimaLT: Minimal-latency Networking Through Better Security

W. Michael Petullo, Xu Zhang, Jon A. Solworth, Daniel J. Bernstein, and Tanja Lange

Abstract

Minimal Latency Tunneling (MinimaLT) is a new network protocol that provides ubiquitous encryption for maximal confidentiality, including protecting packet headers. MinimaLT provides server and user authentication, extensive Denial-of-Service protections, privacy-preserving IP mobility, and fast key erasure. We describe the protocol, demonstrate its performance relative to TLS and unencrypted TCP/IP, and analyze its protections, including its resilience against DoS attacks. By exploiting the properties of its cryptographic protections, MinimaLT is able to eliminate three-way handshakes and thus create connections faster than unencrypted TCP/IP.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown status
Keywords: network security encryption authentication
Contact author(s): tanja @ hyperelliptic org
History: 2013-10-31: revised; 2013-05-25: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2013/310
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/310,
      author = {W.  Michael Petullo and Xu Zhang and Jon A.  Solworth and Daniel J.  Bernstein and Tanja Lange},
      title = {MinimaLT: Minimal-latency Networking Through Better Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/310},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/310}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/310}
}