Paper 2013/305

Towards Fresh Re-Keying with Leakage-Resilient PRFs: Cipher Design Principles and Analysis

Sonia Belaid, Fabrizio De Santis, Johann Heyszl, Stefan Mangard, Marcel Medwed, Jorn-Marc Schmidt, Francois-Xavier Standaert, and Stefan Tillich

Abstract

Leakage-resilient cryptography aims at developing new algorithms for which physical security against side-channel attacks can be formally analyzed. Following the work of Dziembowski and Pietrzak at FOCS 2008, several symmetric cryptographic primitives have been investigated in this setting. Most of them can be instantiated with a block cipher as underlying component. Such an approach naturally raises the question whether certain block ciphers are better suited for this purpose. In order to answer this question, we consider a leakage-resilient re-keying function, and evaluate its security at different abstraction levels. That is, we study possible attacks exploiting specific features of the algorithmic description, hardware architecture and physical implementation of this construction. These evaluations lead to two main outcomes. First, we complement previous works on leakage-resilient cryptography and further specify the conditions under which they actually provide physical security. Second, we take advantage of our analysis to extract new design principles for block ciphers to be used in leakage-resilient primitives. While our investigations focus on side-channel attacks in the first place, we hope these new design principles will trigger the interest of symmetric cryptographers to design new block ciphers combining good properties for secure implementations and security against black box (mathematical) cryptanalysis.