Path ORAM: An Extremely Simple Oblivious RAM Protocol

Emil Stefanov; Marten van Dijk; Elaine Shi; T-H.  Hubert Chan; Christopher Fletcher; Ling Ren; Xiangyao Yu; Srinivas Devadas

Paper 2013/280

Path ORAM: An Extremely Simple Oblivious RAM Protocol

Emil Stefanov, Marten van Dijk, Elaine Shi, T-H. Hubert Chan, Christopher Fletcher, Ling Ren, Xiangyao Yu, and Srinivas Devadas

Abstract

We present Path ORAM, an extremely simple Oblivious RAM protocol with a small amount of client storage. Partly due to its simplicity, Path ORAM is the most practical ORAM scheme known to date with small client storage. We formally prove that Path ORAM has a$O(log N) bandwidth cost for blocks of size B = Omega(log^2 N) bits. For such block sizes, Path ORAM is asymptotically better than the best known ORAM schemes with small client storage. Due to its practicality, Path ORAM has been adopted in the design of secure processors since its proposal.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Major revision. CCS 2013
Keywords: oblivious ram oram privacy storage access patterns
Contact author(s): emil @ cs berkeley edu
History: 2014-01-14: revised; 2013-05-16: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2013/280
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/280,
      author = {Emil Stefanov and Marten van Dijk and Elaine Shi and T-H.  Hubert Chan and Christopher Fletcher and Ling Ren and Xiangyao Yu and Srinivas Devadas},
      title = {Path {ORAM}: An Extremely Simple Oblivious {RAM} Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/280},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/280}
}