Paper 2013/190

Power Analysis Attacks against FPGA Implementations of KLEIN

Shaohua Tang, Jianhao Wu, Weijian Li, and Zheng Gong


KLEIN is a family of block ciphers proposed by Zheng Gong et al. at RFIDSec 2011, and its lightweight features are suitable for resource-constrained devices. However, the original design of KLEIN does not consider the potential attacks by power analysis methods. This paper presents power analysis attacks against a FPGA implementation of KLEIN by the authors of KLEIN. The attacking strategy, attacking point and complexity of our attacks via power analysis against KLEIN are discussed in detail. Besides, the implementation of the attacks is also described, and the experimental data is given. A lot of attacking experiments are launched by this paper, and the experiments confirm that the success probability of our attacks is nearly 100%. Finally, a defensive countermeasure against our attacks is proposed.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
power analysis attackKLEINFPGA
Contact author(s)
csshtang @ gmail com
2013-04-02: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Shaohua Tang and Jianhao Wu and Weijian Li and Zheng Gong},
      title = {Power Analysis Attacks against FPGA Implementations of KLEIN},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/190},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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