Paper 2013/185
Security Analysis of Linearly Filtered NLFSRs
Mohammad Ali Orumiehchiha, Josef Pieprzyk, Ron Steinfeld, and Harry Bartlett
Abstract
Our contributions are applying distinguishing attack on Linearly Filtered NLFSR as a primitive or associated with filter generators. We extend the attack on linear combinations of Linearly Filtered NLFSRs as well. Generally, these structures can be examined by the proposed techniques and the criteria will be achieved to design secure primitive. The attacks allow attacker to mount linear attack to distinguish the output of the cipher and recover its internal state. Also, we investigate security of the modified version of Grain stream cipher to present how invulnerable is the scheme against distinguishing attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Non-linear feedback shift registerLinearly Filtered NLFSRCryptanalysisKey Recovery AttackDistinguishing Attack.
- Contact author(s)
- orumiehchi @ gmail com
- History
- 2013-04-02: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/185
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/185, author = {Mohammad Ali Orumiehchiha and Josef Pieprzyk and Ron Steinfeld and Harry Bartlett}, title = {Security Analysis of Linearly Filtered {NLFSRs}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/185}, year = {2013}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/185} }