On the Applicability of Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices (Extended Version)

Raphael Spreitzer and Thomas Plos

Abstract

Cache attacks are known to be sophisticated attacks against cryptographic implementations on desktop computers. Recently, also investigations of such attacks on testbeds with processors that are employed in mobile devices have been done. In this work we investigate the applicability of Bernstein's timing attack and the cache-collision attack by Bogdanov et al. in real environments on three state-of-the-art mobile devices. These devices are: an Acer Iconia A510, a Google Nexus S, and a Samsung Galaxy SIII. We show that T-table based implementations of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) leak enough timing information on these devices in order to recover parts of the used secret key using Bernstein's timing attack. We also show that systems with a cache-line size larger than 32 bytes exacerbate the cache-collision attack by Bogdanov et al.

Available format(s)
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Extended version of a short paper accepted at NSS 2013
Keywords
AESARM Cortex-A series processorstime-driven cache attackscache-collision attacks
Contact author(s)
raphael spreitzer @ iaik tugraz at
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/172

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/172,
author = {Raphael Spreitzer and Thomas Plos},
title = {On the Applicability of Time-Driven Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices (Extended Version)},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/172},
year = {2013},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/172}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/172}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.