Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/108

Unconditionally Secure and Universally Composable Commitments from Physical Assumptions

Ivan Damgard and Alessandra Scafuro

Abstract: We present a constant-round unconditional black-box compiler that transforms any ideal (i.e., statistically-hiding and statistically-binding) straight-line extractable commitment scheme, into an extractable and equivocal commitment scheme, therefore yielding to UC-security [9]. We exemplify the usefulness of our compiler by providing two (constant-round) instantiations of ideal straight-line extractable commitment based on (malicious) PUFs [36] and stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens [26], therefore achieving the first unconditionally UC-secure commitment with malicious PUFs and stateless tokens, respectively. Our constructions are secure for adversaries creating arbitrarily malicious stateful PUFs/tokens. Previous results with malicious PUFs used either computational assumptions to achieve UC- secure commitments or were unconditionally secure but only in the indistinguishability sense [36]. Similarly, with stateless tokens, UC-secure commitments are known only under computational assumptions [13, 24, 15], while the (not UC) unconditional commitment scheme of [23] is secure only in a weaker model in which the adversary is not allowed to create stateful tokens. Besides allowing us to prove feasibility of unconditional UC-security with (malicious) PUFs and stateless tokens, our compiler can be instantiated with any ideal straight-line extractable commitment scheme, thus allowing the use of various setup assumptions which may better fit the application or the technology available.

Category / Keywords: foundations / UC, hardware assumptions, unconditional security, commitment scheme

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2013

Date: received 24 Feb 2013, last revised 3 Mar 2015

Contact author: alescafu at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Updated related work.

Version: 20150303:225245 (All versions of this report)

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