Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/067

Power Analysis of Hardware Implementations Protected with Secret Sharing

Guido Bertoni and Joan Daemen and Nicolas Debande and Thanh-Ha Le and Michael Peeters and Gilles Van Assche

Abstract: We analyze the security of three-share hardware implementations against differential power analysis and advanced variants such as mutual information analysis. We present dedicated distinguishers that allow to recover secret key bits from any cryptographic primitive that is implemented as a sequence of quadratic functions. Starting from the analytical treatment of such distinguishers and information-theoretic arguments, we derive the success probability and required number of traces in the presence of algorithmic noise. We show that attacks on three-share hardware implementation require a number of traces that scales in the third power of the algorithmic noise variance. Finally, we apply and test our model on Keccak in a keyed mode.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / power analysis; quadratic functions; mutual information analysis; Keccak

Publication Info: Extended version of paper presented at Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP) in Vancouver, BC, Canada, December 2, 2012

Date: received 12 Feb 2013, last revised 14 Feb 2013

Contact author: joan daemen at st com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20130220:093303 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]