### Non-Interactive Key Exchange

Eduarda S. V. Freire, Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz, and Kenneth G. Paterson

##### Abstract

Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental but much-overlooked cryptographic primitive. It appears as a major contribution in the ground-breaking paper of Diffie and Hellman, but NIKE has remained largely unstudied since then. In this paper, we provide different security models for this primitive and explore the relationships between them. We then give constructions for secure NIKE in the Random Oracle Model based on the hardness of factoring and in the standard model based on the hardness of a variant of the decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem for asymmetric pairings. We also study the relationship between NIKE and public key encryption (PKE), showing that a secure NIKE scheme can be generically converted into an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. This conversion also illustrates the fundamental nature of NIKE in public key cryptography.

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. This is the full version of a paper to appear at PKC 2013
Contact author(s)
kenny paterson @ rhul ac uk
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/732

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/732,
author = {Eduarda S. V.  Freire and Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz and Kenneth G.  Paterson},
title = {Non-Interactive Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/732},
year = {2012},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/732}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/732}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.