Paper 2012/732
Non-Interactive Key Exchange
Abstract
Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental but much-overlooked cryptographic primitive. It appears as a major contribution in the ground-breaking paper of Diffie and Hellman, but NIKE has remained largely unstudied since then. In this paper, we provide different security models for this primitive and explore the relationships between them. We then give constructions for secure NIKE in the Random Oracle Model based on the hardness of factoring and in the standard model based on the hardness of a variant of the decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem for asymmetric pairings. We also study the relationship between NIKE and public key encryption (PKE), showing that a secure NIKE scheme can be generically converted into an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. This conversion also illustrates the fundamental nature of NIKE in public key cryptography.
Note: Change relative to previous version: small correction/clarification in the proof of Theorem 8 (App.B).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. This is the full version of a paper to appear at PKC 2013
- Contact author(s)
- hofheinz @ inf ethz ch
- History
- 2023-08-10: revised
- 2013-01-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/732
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/732,
author = {Eduarda S. V. Freire and Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz and Kenneth G. Paterson},
title = {Non-Interactive Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/732},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/732}
}
