Paper 2012/731

Time-memory Trade-offs for Near-collisions

Gaëtan Leurent

Abstract

In this work we consider generic algorithms to find near-collisions for a hash function. If we consider only hash computations, it is easy to compute a lower-bound for the complexity of near-collision algorithms, and to build a matching algorithm. However, this algorithm needs a lot of memory, and makes than 2^{n/2} memory accesses. Recently, several algorithms have been proposed without this memory requirement; they require more hash evaluations, but the attack is actually more practical. They can be divided in two main categories: some are based on truncation, and some are based on covering codes. In this paper, we give a new insight to the generic complexity of a near-collision attack. First, we consider time-memory trade-offs for truncation-based algorithms. For a practical implementation, it seems reasonable to assume that some memory is available and we show that taking advantage of this memory can significantly reduce the complexity. Second, we show a new method combining truncation and covering codes. The new algorithm is always at least as good as the previous works, and often gives a significant improvement. We illustrate our results by giving a 10-near collision for MD5: our algorithm has a complexity of 2^45.4 using 1TB of memory while the best previous

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Hash functionnear-collisiongeneric attacktime-memory trade-off
Contact author(s)
gaetan leurent @ normalesup org
History
2013-01-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/731
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/731,
      author = {Gaëtan Leurent},
      title = {Time-memory Trade-offs for Near-collisions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/731},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/731}
}
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