Paper 2012/725
Cryptanalysis of an efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol
Qingfeng Cheng
Abstract
Recently, He et al. (Computers and Mathematics with Applications, 2012, 64(6): 1914-1926) proposed a new efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol. They claimed their protocol was provably secure in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. In this paper, we will show that their protocol is insecure. A type I adversary, who obtains one party's ephemeral private key, can impersonate the party to cheat the other party and compute the shared session key successfully. For overcoming this weakness, we also propose a simple countermeasure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- AuthenticationCertificateless cryptographyKey agreementTwo-partyEphemeral key compromise attackKey replacement attack
- Contact author(s)
- qingfengc2008 @ sina com
- History
- 2012-12-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/725
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/725,
author = {Qingfeng Cheng},
title = {Cryptanalysis of an efficient certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/725},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/725}
}
