### Cryptanalysis of RAPP, an RFID Authentication Protocol

Nasour Bagheri, Masoumeh Safkhani, Pedro Peris-Lopez, and Juan E. Tapiador

##### Abstract

Tian et al. proposed a novel ultralightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [4] that has recently been analyzed in [1], [2], [5]. In this letter, we first propose a desynchronization attack that succeeds with probability almost 1, which improves upon the 0.25 given by the attack in [1]. We also show that the bad properties of the proposed permutation function can be exploited to disclose several bits of the tag’s secret (rather than just one bit as in [2]), which increases the power of a traceability attack. Finally, we show how to extend the above attack to run a full disclosure attack, which requires to eavesdrop less protocol runs than the attack described in [5] (i.e., 192 << 230).

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
RFIDAuthenticationAttacks
Contact author(s)
na bagheri @ gmail com
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/702

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/702,
author = {Nasour Bagheri and Masoumeh Safkhani and Pedro Peris-Lopez and Juan E.  Tapiador},
title = {Cryptanalysis of RAPP, an RFID Authentication Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/702},
year = {2012},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/702}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/702}
}

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