Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/695

Fully Automated Analysis of Padding-Based Encryption in the Computational Model

Gilles Barthe and Juan Manuel Crespo and Benjamin Grégoire and César Kunz and Yassine Lakhnech and Benedikt Schmidt and Santiago Zanella-Béguelin

Abstract: Computer-aided verification provides effective means of analyzing the security of cryptographic primitives. However, it has remained a challenge to achieve fully automated analyses yielding guarantees that hold against computational (rather than symbolic) attacks. This paper meets this challenge for public-key encryption schemes built from trapdoor permutations and hash functions. Using a novel combination of techniques from computational and symbolic cryptography, we present proof systems for analyzing the chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext security of such schemes in the random oracle model. Building on these proof systems, we develop a toolset that bundles together fully automated proof and attack finding algorithms. We use this toolset to build a comprehensive database of encryption schemes that records attacks against insecure schemes, and proofs with concrete bounds for secure ones.

Category / Keywords: Public-key cryptography / Attack finding, automated proofs, EasyCrypt, provable security, public-key encryption, static equivalence

Publication Info: An abridged version of this paper is under submission. This is the full version.

Date: received 11 Dec 2012, last revised 3 Jul 2013

Contact author: santiago at microsoft com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20130703:160407 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/695