Paper 2012/650

Formal analysis of privacy in Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes

Ben Smyth, Mark D. Ryan, and Liqun Chen


This article introduces a definition of privacy for Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes. The definition is expressed as an equivalence property which is suited to automated reasoning using Blanchet's ProVerif. The practicality of the definition is demonstrated by analysing the RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol by Brickell, Camenisch & Chen. The analysis discovers a vulnerability in the RSA-based scheme which can be exploited by a passive adversary and, under weaker assumptions, corrupt administrators. A security fix is identified and the revised protocol is shown to satisfy our definition of privacy.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. This article is a based upon our ESAS'07 & FAST'11 conference papers and Chapter 4 of Smyth's PhD thesis.
Accountabilityanonymityapplied pi calculusDirect Anonymous AttestationprivacyProVeriftrusted computingTPMtraceabilityunlinkability.
Contact author(s)
inria @ bensmyth com
2015-03-04: last of 2 revisions
2012-11-21: received
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      author = {Ben Smyth and Mark D.  Ryan and Liqun Chen},
      title = {Formal analysis of privacy in Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/650},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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