Paper 2012/621

Biclique Cryptanalysis of Lightweight Block Ciphers PRESENT, Piccolo and LED

Kitae Jeong, HyungChul Kang, Changhoon Lee, Jaechul Sung, and Seokhie Hong


In this paper, we evaluate the security of lightweight block ciphers PRESENT, Piccolo and LED against biclique cryptanalysis. To recover the secret key of PRESENT-80/128, our attacks require $2^{79.76}$ full PRESENT-80 encryptions and $2^{127.91}$ full PRESENT-128 encryptions, respectively. Our attacks on Piccolo-80/128 require computational complexities of $2^{79.13}$ and $2^{127.35}$, respectively. The attack on a $29$-round reduced LED-64 needs $2^{63.58}$ 29-round reduced LED-64 encryptions. In the cases of LED-80/96/128, we propose the attacks on two versions. First, to recover the secret key of $45$-round reduced LED-80/96/128, our attacks require computational complexities of $2^{79.45}, 2^{95.45}$ and $2^{127.45}$, respectively. To attack the full version, we require computational complexities of $2^{79.37}, 2^{95.37}$ and $2^{127.37}$, respectively. However, in these cases, we need the full codebook. These results are superior to known biclique cryptanalytic results on them.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Block cipherPRESENTPiccoloLEDBicliqueCryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
kite jeong @ gmail com
2012-11-08: revised
2012-11-05: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Kitae Jeong and HyungChul Kang and Changhoon Lee and Jaechul Sung and Seokhie Hong},
      title = {Biclique Cryptanalysis of Lightweight Block Ciphers {PRESENT}, Piccolo and {LED}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/621},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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