Paper 2012/594
Improved Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced Version of Camellia-192/256
Ya Liu, Dawu Gu, Zhiqiang Liu, and Wei Li
Abstract
As an ISO/IEC international standard, Camellia has been used various cryptographic applications. In this paper, we improve previous attacks on Camellia-192/256 with key-dependent layers $FL/FL^{-1}$ by using the intrinsic weakness of keyed functions. Specifically, we present the first impossible differential attack on 13-round Camellia with $2^{121.6}$ chosen ciphertexts and $2^{189.9}$ 13-round encryptions, while the analysis for the biggest number of rounds in previous results on Camellia-192 worked on 12 rounds. Furthermore, we successfully attack 14-round Camellia-256 with $2^{122.1}$ chosen ciphertexts and $2^{229.3}$ 14-round encryptions. Compared with the previously best known attack on 14-round Camellia-256, the time complexity of our attack is reduced by $2^{8.9}$ times and the data complexity is comparable.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Submit to Information Processing Letters
- Keywords
- Block CipherCamelliaImpossible Differential Cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- liuyaloccs @ gmail com
- History
- 2012-10-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/594
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/594,
author = {Ya Liu and Dawu Gu and Zhiqiang Liu and Wei Li},
title = {Improved Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced Version of Camellia-192/256},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/594},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/594}
}
