Paper 2012/586
SHADE: Secure HAmming DistancE computation from oblivious transfer
Julien Bringer, Herve Chabanne, and Alain Patey
Abstract
We introduce two new schemes for securely computing Hamming distance in the two-party setting. Our first scheme is a very efficient protocol, based solely on 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer, that achieves full security in the semi-honest setting and one-sided security in the malicious setting. Moreover we show that this protocol is significantly more efficient than the previous proposals, that are either based on garbled circuits or on homomorphic encryption. Our second scheme achieves full security against malicious adversaries and is based on Committed Oblivious Transfer. These protocols have direct applications to secure biometric identification.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Secure Multi-Party ComputationHamming DistanceOblivious TransferBiometric Identification
- Contact author(s)
- alain patey @ telecom-paristech fr
- History
- 2012-10-16: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/586
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/586,
author = {Julien Bringer and Herve Chabanne and Alain Patey},
title = {{SHADE}: Secure {HAmming} {DistancE} computation from oblivious transfer},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/586},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/586}
}
