Paper 2012/553
Bellcore attack in practice
Andrey Sidorenko, Joachim van den Berg, Remko Foekema, Michiel Grashuis, and Jaap de Vos
Abstract
In this paper we analyze practical aspects of the differential fault attack on RSA published by Boneh, Demillo and Lipton from Bellcore. We focus on the CRT variant, which requires only one faulty signature to be entirely broken provided that no DFA countermeasures are in use. Usually the easiest approach for the attacker is to introduce a fault in one of the two RSA-CRT exponentiations. These are time-consuming and often clearly visible in the power profiles. However, protection of the exponentiations against faults does not always circumvent the Bellcore attack. Our goal is to investigate and classify other possible targets of the attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Bellcore attackDFAlight manipulationperturbation attacks
- Contact author(s)
- sidorenko @ brightsight com
- History
- 2012-09-27: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/553
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/553,
author = {Andrey Sidorenko and Joachim van den Berg and Remko Foekema and Michiel Grashuis and Jaap de Vos},
title = {Bellcore attack in practice},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/553},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/553}
}
