Paper 2012/490
Desynchronization Attack on RAPP Ultralightweight Authentication Protocol
Zahra Ahmadian, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh, and Mohammad Reza Aref
Abstract
RAPP (RFID Authentication Protocol with Permutation) is a recently proposed efficient ultralightweight authentication protocol. The operation used in this protocol is totally different from the other existing ultralightweight protocols due to the use of new introduced data dependent permutations and avoidances of modular arithmetic operations and biased logical operations such as AND and OR. The designers of RAPP claimed that this protocol resists against desynchronization attacks since the last messages of the protocol is sent by the reader and not by the tag. This letter challenges this assumption and shows that RAPP is vulnerable against desynchronization attack. This attack has a remarkable probability of success and is effective whether Hamming weight-based or modular-based rotations are used by the protocol.
Note: -
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RAPPRFID securityUltralightweight protocolsdesynchronization attack.
- Contact author(s)
- zahraahmadian @ yahoo com
- History
- 2012-09-06: revised
- 2012-09-03: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/490
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/490,
author = {Zahra Ahmadian and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh and Mohammad Reza Aref},
title = {Desynchronization Attack on {RAPP} Ultralightweight Authentication Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/490},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/490}
}
