Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/421

Security margin evaluation of SHA-3 contest finalists through SAT-based attacks

Ekawat Homsirikamol and Pawel Morawiecki and Marcin Rogawski and Marian Srebrny

Abstract: In 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. In this paper, the security margin of five SHA-3 finalists is evaluated with an assumption that attacks launched on finalists should be practically verified. A method of attacks applied is called logical cryptanalysis where the original task is expressed as a SATisfiability problem instance. A new toolkit is used to simplify the most arduous stages of this type of cryptanalysis and helps to mount the attacks in a uniform way. In the context of SAT-based attacks, it has been shown that all the finalists have substantially bigger security margin than the current standards SHA-256 and SHA-1. Two other metrics, software performance and hardware efficiency are combined with security results to provide a more comprehensive picture of the SHA-3 finalists.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / SHA-3 competition, algebraic cryptanalysis, logical cryptanalysis, SATisfiability solvers

Publication Info: It is an extended version of the paper presented at CISIM '12 Conference and published in LNCS, Volume 7564

Date: received 26 Jul 2012

Contact author: pawelm at wsh-kielce edu pl

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Version: 20120802:140431 (All versions of this report)

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