Paper 2012/410
Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Multiple Key Agreement Scheme
Qingfeng Cheng
Abstract
Multiple key agreement (MKA) protocols allow two parties to generate two or more session keys in one session, which will be used for future secure communications in public network. In recent years, many MKA protocols have been proposed. However, most of them do not consider ephemeral key compromise resilience, and some of them still exists security flaws. In this paper, we analyze the scheme proposed by Dehkordi and Alimoradi in 2011, which is announced with stronger security. We will present ephemeral key compromise attack and impersonation attack against Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol. For overcoming these security flaws, we also propose an improvement of Dehkordi and Alimoradi’s protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- multiple key agreementbilinear pairingmutual authenticationephemeral key compromise attackimpersonation attack
- Contact author(s)
- qingfengc2008 @ sina com
- History
- 2012-07-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/410
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/410, author = {Qingfeng Cheng}, title = {Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Multiple Key Agreement Scheme}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/410}, year = {2012}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/410} }