Paper 2012/382

On the Joint Security of Signature and Encryption Schemes under Randomness Reuse: Efficiency and Security Amplification

Afonso Arriaga, Manuel Barbosa, and Pooya Farshim

Abstract

We extend the work of Bellare, Boldyreva and Staddon on the systematic analysis of randomness reuse to construct multi-recipient encryption schemes to the case where randomness is reused across different cryptographic primitives. We find that through the additional binding introduced through randomness reuse, one can actually obtain a security amplification with respect to the standard black-box compositions, and achieve a stronger level of security. We introduce stronger notions of security for encryption and signatures, where challenge messages can depend in a restricted way on the random coins used in encryption, and show that two variants of the KEM/DEM paradigm give rise to encryption schemes that meet this enhanced notion of security. We obtain a very efficient signcryption scheme that is secure against insider attackers without random oracles.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Full version of the paper published at ACNS 2012.
Keywords
Randomness reuseSigncryptionInsider Security.
Contact author(s)
mbb @ di uminho pt
History
2012-07-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/382
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/382,
      author = {Afonso Arriaga and Manuel Barbosa and Pooya Farshim},
      title = {On the Joint Security of Signature and Encryption Schemes under Randomness Reuse: Efficiency and Security Amplification},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/382},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/382}
}
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