Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/380

Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices

Ioana Boureanu and Serge Vaudenay

Abstract: Following both theoretical and practical arguments, we construct UC-secure bit-commitment protocols that place their strength on the sender’s side and are built using tamper-evident devices, e.g., a type of distinguishable, sealed envelopes. We show that by using a second formalisation of tamper-evident distinguishable envelopes we can attain better security guarantees, i.e., EUC-security. We show the relations between several flavours of weak bit-commitments, bit-commitments and distinguishable tamper-evident envelopes. We focus, at all points, on the lightweight nature of the underlying mechanisms and on the end-to-end human verifiability.

Category / Keywords: UC framework, bit-commitment, tamper-evidence

Publication Info: A shorter version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of ProvSec'12, LNCS, Springer

Date: received 5 Jul 2012, last revised 11 Sep 2012

Contact author: ioana boureanu at epfl ch

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20120911:100651 (All versions of this report)

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