Paper 2012/380
Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices
Ioana Boureanu and Serge Vaudenay
Abstract
Following both theoretical and practical arguments, we construct UC-secure bit-commitment protocols that place their strength on the sender’s side and are built using tamper-evident devices, e.g., a type of distinguishable, sealed envelopes. We show that by using a second formalisation of tamper-evident distinguishable envelopes we can attain better security guarantees, i.e., EUC-security. We show the relations between several flavours of weak bit-commitments, bit-commitments and distinguishable tamper-evident envelopes. We focus, at all points, on the lightweight nature of the underlying mechanisms and on the end-to-end human verifiability.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. A shorter version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of ProvSec'12, LNCS, Springer
- Keywords
- UC frameworkbit-commitmenttamper-evidence
- Contact author(s)
- ioana boureanu @ epfl ch
- History
- 2012-09-11: revised
- 2012-07-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/380
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/380, author = {Ioana Boureanu and Serge Vaudenay}, title = {Several Weak Bit-Commitments Using Seal-Once Tamper-Evident Devices}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/380}, year = {2012}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/380} }