Paper 2012/347

Algebraic Differential Fault Attacks on LED using a Single Fault Injection

Xinjie Zhao, Shize Guo, Fan Zhang, Tao Wang, Zhijie Shi, and Keke Ji


This paper proposes a new fault attack technique on the LED block cipher using a single fault injection by combining algebraic side-channel attack (ASCA) and differential fault attack (DFA). We name it as algebraic differential fault attack (ADFA). Firstly, a boolean equation set is constructed for LED using algebraic techniques. Then, the fault differences of the S-Box inputs in the last round of LED are deduced by DFA and represented using algebraic equations by the multiple deductions-based ASCA (MDASCA) technique proposed in COSADE 2012. Finally, the key is recovered by solving the equation set with the CryptoMiniSat solver. We show that, as to ADFA on LED under the single nibble-based fault model, the 64-bit key can be recovered within one minute on a common PC with a success rate of 79\%, which is more efficient than previous work. We modify the CryptoMiniSat solver to count and output multiple solutions for the key, and conduct ADFA to calculate the reduced key search space for DFA. The key search space of LED is reduced to $2^6 \sim 2^{17}$, which is different from previous work. We also successfully extend ADFA on LED to other fault models using a single fault injection, such as byte based fault model and nibble based diagonal fault model, where traditional DFAs are difficult to work. The results show that ADFA is an efficient and generic fault analysis technique which significantly improves DFA.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Algebraic fault analysisLED
Contact author(s)
zhaoxinjieem @ 163 com
2012-06-22: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Xinjie Zhao and Shize Guo and Fan Zhang and Tao Wang and Zhijie Shi and Keke Ji},
      title = {Algebraic Differential Fault Attacks on LED using a Single Fault Injection},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/347},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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