Paper 2012/316
Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker in Action
Gergei Bana, Pedro Adão, and Hideki Sakurada
Abstract
In this paper we show that the recent technique of computationally complete symbolic attackers proposed by Bana and Comon-Lundh for computationally sound verification is powerful enough to verify actual protocols, such as the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol. In their model, one does not define explicit Dolev-Yao adversarial capabilities but rather the limitations of the adversarial capabilities. In this paper we present a set of axioms sufficient to show that no symbolic adversary compliant with these axioms can successfully violate secrecy or authentication in case of the NSL protocol. Hence all implementations for which these axioms are sound – namely, implementations using CCA2 encryption, and satisfying a minimal parsing requirement for pairing – exclude the possibility of successful computational attacks.
Note: Simplified the soundness proofs and changed the title
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- symbolic verificationcomputational soundness
- Contact author(s)
- bana @ math upenn edu
- History
- 2012-10-29: last of 6 revisions
- 2012-06-05: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/316
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/316,
author = {Gergei Bana and Pedro Adão and Hideki Sakurada},
title = {Computationally Complete Symbolic Attacker in Action},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/316},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/316}
}
