Paper 2012/292
An Adaptive-Ciphertext Attack against "I $\oplus$ C'' Block Cipher Modes With an Oracle
Jon Passki and Tom Ritter
Abstract
Certain block cipher confidentiality modes are susceptible to an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack against the underlying format of the plaintext. When the application decrypts altered ciphertext and attempts to process the manipulated plaintext, it may disclose information about intermediate values resulting in an oracle. In this paper we describe how to recognize and exploit such an oracle to decrypt ciphertext and control the decryption to result in arbitrary plaintext. We also discuss ways to mitigate and remedy the issue.
Note: Revised to include references to some more work on the topic.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Personal and Company Websites
- Keywords
- block ciphersblock cipher modeschosen ciphertext attack
- Contact author(s)
- tom @ ritter vg
- History
- 2012-07-02: revised
- 2012-05-29: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/292
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/292,
author = {Jon Passki and Tom Ritter},
title = {An Adaptive-Ciphertext Attack against "I $\oplus$ C'' Block Cipher Modes With an Oracle},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/292},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/292}
}
