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Paper 2012/290

Fully Homomorphic Message Authenticators

Rosario Gennaro and Daniel Wichs

Abstract

We define and construct fully homomorphic message authenticators. In such a scheme, anybody can perform arbitrary computations over authenticated data and produce a short tag that authenticates the result of the computation. The user verifies this tag with her private key to ensure that the claimed result is indeed the correct output of the specified computation over previously authenticated data, without needing to know the underlying data itself. For example, a user can outsource the storage of large amounts of authenticated data to a remote server, and the server can later non-interactively certify the outputs of various computations over this data with only a short tag. Our construction uses fully homomorphic encryption in a novel way.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2013
Keywords
verifiable computinghomomorphic signatureshomomorphic encryption
Contact author(s)
wichs @ cs nyu edu
History
2013-08-27: revised
2012-05-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/290
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/290,
      author = {Rosario Gennaro and Daniel Wichs},
      title = {Fully Homomorphic Message Authenticators},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/290},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/290}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/290}
}
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