Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/268

On the CCA2 Security of McEliece in the Standard Model

Edoardo Persichetti

Abstract: In this paper we study public-key encryption schemes based on error-correcting codes that are IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model. In particular, we analyze a protocol due to Dowsley, Muller-Quade and Nascimento, based on a work of Rosen and Segev. The original formulation of the protocol contained some ambiguities and incongruences, which we point out and correct; moreover, the protocol deviates substantially from the work it is based on. We then present a construction which resembles more closely the original Rosen-Segev framework, and show how this can be instantiated with the McEliece scheme.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / CCA2

Original Publication (with minor differences): ProvSec '18
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-01446-9_10

Date: received 11 May 2012, last revised 23 Sep 2018

Contact author: epersichetti at fau edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180924:030117 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/268


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]