On the CCA2 Security of McEliece in the Standard Model

Edoardo Persichetti

Paper 2012/268

On the CCA2 Security of McEliece in the Standard Model

Edoardo Persichetti

Abstract

In this paper we study public-key encryption schemes based on error-correcting codes that are IND-CCA2 secure in the standard model. In particular, we analyze a protocol due to Dowsley, Muller-Quade and Nascimento, based on a work of Rosen and Segev. The original formulation of the protocol contained some ambiguities and incongruences, which we point out and correct; moreover, the protocol deviates substantially from the work it is based on. We then present a construction which resembles more closely the original Rosen-Segev framework, and show how this can be instantiated with the McEliece scheme.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ProvSec '18
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-01446-9_10
Keywords: CCA2
Contact author(s): epersichetti @ fau edu
History: 2018-09-24: last of 5 revisions; 2012-05-21: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/268
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/268,
      author = {Edoardo Persichetti},
      title = {On the {CCA2} Security of {McEliece} in the Standard Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/268},
      year = {2012},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-01446-9_10},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/268}
}