## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/256

The myth of generic DPA...and the magic of learning

Carolyn Whitnall and Elisabeth Oswald and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract: A generic DPA strategy is one which is able to recover secret information from physically observable device leakage without any a priori knowledge about the device's leakage characteristics. Here we provide much-needed clarification on results emerging from the existing literature, demonstrating precisely that such methods (strictly defined) are inherently restricted to a very limited selection of target functions. Continuing to search related techniques for a silver bullet' generic attack appears a bootless errand. However, we find that a minor relaxation of the strict definition---the incorporation of some minimal non-device-specific intuition---produces scope for generic-emulating strategies, able to succeed against a far wider range of targets. We present stepwise regression as an example of such, and demonstrate its effectiveness in a variety of scenarios. We also give some evidence that its practical performance matches that of best bit' DoM attacks which we take as further indication for the necessity of performing profiled attacks in the context of device evaluations.

Category / Keywords: side-channel analysis, differential power analysis, generic DPA

Original Publication (in the same form): Proceedings of CT-RSA 2014
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-04852-9_10.

Date: received 5 May 2012, last revised 4 Aug 2014

Contact author: carolyn whitnall at bris ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Revised to match author version of the article as published in the proceedings of CT-RSA 2014.

Short URL: ia.cr/2012/256

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