Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/211

Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange from Factoring, Codes, and Lattices

Atsushi Fujioka and Koutarou Suzuki and Keita Xagawa and Kazuki Yoneyama

Abstract: An unresolved problem in research on authenticated key exchange (AKE) is to construct a secure protocol against advanced attacks such as key compromise impersonation and maximal exposure attacks without relying on random oracles. HMQV, a state of the art AKE protocol, achieves both efficiency and the strong security proposed by Krawczyk (we call it the CK+ model), which includes resistance to advanced attacks. However, the security proof is given under the random oracle model. We propose a generic construction of AKE from a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). The construction is based on a chosen-ciphertext secure KEM, and the resultant AKE protocol is CK+ secure in the standard model. The construction gives the first CK+ secure AKE protocols based on the hardness of integer factorization problem, code-based problems, or learning problems with errors. In addition, instantiations under the Diffie-Hellman assumption or its variant can be proved to have strong security without non-standard assumptions such as $\pi$PRF and KEA1. Furthermore, we extend the CK+ model to identity-based (called the id-CK+ model), and propose a generic construction of identity-based AKE (ID-AKE) based on identity-based KEM, which satisfies id-CK+ security. The construction leads first strongly secure ID-AKE protocols under the hardness of integer factorization problem, or learning problems with errors.

Category / Keywords: authenticated key exchange, CK+ model, key encapsulation mechanism, identity-based authenticated key exchange

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-PKC-2012

Date: received 16 Apr 2012, last revised 19 Aug 2013

Contact author: yoneyama kazuki at lab ntt co jp, kazuki yoneyama@gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: A result for the identity-based setting is added.

Version: 20130819:081153 (All versions of this report)

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