Paper 2012/172
Attacking RSA-CRT Signatures with Faults on Montgomery Multiplication
Pierre-Alain Fouque, Nicolas Guillermin, Delphine Leresteux, Mehdi Tibouchi, and Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz
Abstract
In this paper, we present several efficient fault attacks against implementations of RSA-CRT signatures that use modular exponentiation algorithms based on Montgomery multiplication. They apply to any padding function, including randomized paddings, and as such are the first fault attacks effective against RSA-PSS. The new attacks work provided that a small register can be forced to either zero, or a constant value, or a value with zero high-order bits. We show that these models are quite realistic, as such faults can be achieved against many proposed hardware designs for RSA signatures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Fault AttacksMontgomery MultiplicationRSA-CRTRSA-PSS
- Contact author(s)
- mehdi tibouchi @ normalesup org
- History
- 2012-04-11: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/172
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/172,
author = {Pierre-Alain Fouque and Nicolas Guillermin and Delphine Leresteux and Mehdi Tibouchi and Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz},
title = {Attacking {RSA}-{CRT} Signatures with Faults on Montgomery Multiplication},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/172},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/172}
}
