Paper 2012/164

On Secure Two-party Integer Division

Morten Dahl, Chao Ning, and Tomas Toft

Abstract

We consider the problem of {\it secure integer division}: given two Paillier encryptions of -bit values n and d, determine an encryption of \intdiv{n}{d} without leaking any information about n or d. We propose two new protocols solving this problem. The first requires arithmetic operation on encrypted values (secure addition and multiplication) in rounds. This is the most efficient constant-rounds solution to date. The second protocol requires only arithmetic operations in rounds, where is a correctness parameter. Theoretically, this is the most efficient solution to date as all previous solutions have required operations. Indeed, the fact that an solution is possible at all is highly surprising.

Note: Extending the bit-length protocol to base-m and hybrid-base digit-length protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. A shorten version can be seen in Proc. FC' 2012
Keywords
Secure two-party computationSecure integer divisionConstant-roundsBit-Length
Contact author(s)
ncnfl @ 163 com
History
2015-10-16: last of 3 revisions
2012-03-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/164
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/164,
      author = {Morten Dahl and Chao Ning and Tomas Toft},
      title = {On Secure Two-party Integer Division},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/164},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/164}
}
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