Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/139

Formal veri cation of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols using deductive model-checking

Ta Vinh Thong

Abstract: Ad-hoc networks do not rely on a pre-installed infrastructure, but they are formed by end-user devices in a self-organized manner. A consequence of this principle is that end-user devices must also perform routing functions. However, end-user devices can easily be compromised, and they may not follow the routing protocol faithfully. Such compromised and misbehaving nodes can disrupt routing, and hence, disable the operation of the network. In order to cope with this problem, several secured routing protocols have been proposed for ad-hoc networks. However, many of them have design aws that still make them vulnerable to attacks mounted by compromised nodes. In this paper, we propose a formal veri cation method for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols that helps increasing the con dence in a protocol by providing an analysis framework that is more systematic, and hence, less error-prone than the informal analysis. Our approach is based on a new process algebra that we speci cally developed for secure ad-hoc network routing protocols and a deductive proof technique. The novelty of this approach is that contrary to prior attempts to formal veri cation of secure ad-hoc network routing protocols, our veri cation method can be made fully automated, and provides expressiveness for explicitly modelling cryptography privitives

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Automated verification, ad-hoc network routing protocols, formal method, process algebra, cryptography, security

Publication Info: This report is the extended and revised version of our 6 pages conference paper (mentioned in the paper))

Date: received 14 Mar 2012, last revised 15 Aug 2013

Contact author: thong at crysys hu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Corrected many typos, english grammar, and notions, notations, formulations. Removed unnecessary sentences and paragraphs.

Version: 20130815:084615 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]