Paper 2012/100

Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet

Shahram Khazaei, Björn Terelius, and Douglas Wikström

Abstract

We study the heuristically secure mix-net proposed by Puiggalí and Guasch (EVOTE 2010). We present practical attacks on both correctness and privacy for some sets of parameters of the scheme. Although our attacks only allow us to replace a few inputs, or to break the privacy of a few voters, this shows that the scheme can not be proven secure.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
electronic electionsmix-net
Contact author(s)
dog @ csc kth se
History
2012-02-29: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/100
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/100,
      author = {Shahram Khazaei and Björn Terelius and Douglas Wikström},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of a Universally Verifiable Efficient Re-encryption Mixnet},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/100},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/100}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/100}
}
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