Paper 2012/084

Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES

Mohamed Saied Emam Mohamed, Stanislav Bulygin, Michael Zohner, Annelie Heuser, and Michael Walter


In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side- channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in [9]. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of AES and the algebraic representation of the obtained side-channel information in order to speed up the attack and increase the success rate. We study the performance of our improvements in both known and unknown plain-text/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced in [9]. Furthermore, we introduce a method for error handling, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to escape the assumption of an error-free measurement and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.

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Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Algebraic Side-Channel AttackAESError ToleranceIASCA
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mohamed @ cdc informatik tu-darmstadt de
2012-04-16: last of 3 revisions
2012-02-23: received
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      author = {Mohamed Saied Emam Mohamed and Stanislav Bulygin and Michael Zohner and Annelie Heuser and Michael Walter},
      title = {Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2012/084},
      year = {2012},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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