Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/084

Improved Algebraic Side-Channel Attack on AES

Mohamed Saied Emam Mohamed and Stanislav Bulygin and Michael Zohner and Annelie Heuser and Michael Walter

Abstract: In this paper we present improvements of the algebraic side- channel analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) proposed in [9]. In particular, we optimize the algebraic representation of AES and the algebraic representation of the obtained side-channel information in order to speed up the attack and increase the success rate. We study the performance of our improvements in both known and unknown plain-text/ciphertext attack scenarios. Our experiments indicate that in both cases the amount of required side-channel information is less than the one required in the attacks introduced in [9]. Furthermore, we introduce a method for error handling, which allows our improved algebraic side-channel attack to escape the assumption of an error-free measurement and thus become applicable in practice. We demonstrate the practical use of our improved algebraic side-channel attack by inserting predictions from a single-trace template attack.

Category / Keywords: Algebraic Side-Channel Attack, AES, Error Tolerance, IASCA

Date: received 22 Feb 2012, last revised 16 Apr 2012

Contact author: mohamed at cdc informatik tu-darmstadt de

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Version: 20120416:224817 (All versions of this report)

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