Paper 2012/063

Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

Shahram Khazaei and Douglas Wikström

Abstract

We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net. We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.

Note: If you know of additional implementations that are vulnerable, then please let us know about it.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
mix-netelection schemes
Contact author(s)
dog @ csc kth se
History
2012-02-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2012/063
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/063,
      author = {Shahram Khazaei and Douglas Wikström},
      title = {Randomized Partial Checking Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/063},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/063}
}
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