Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

Shahram Khazaei; Douglas Wikström

Paper 2012/063

Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

Shahram Khazaei and Douglas Wikström

Abstract

We study mix-nets with randomized partial checking (RPC) as proposed by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest (2002). RPC is a technique to verify the correctness of an execution both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. The idea is to relax the correctness and privacy requirements to achieve a more efficient mix-net. We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas and the Scantegrity voting systems.

Note: If you know of additional implementations that are vulnerable, then please let us know about it.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: mix-net election schemes
Contact author(s): dog @ csc kth se
History: 2012-02-14: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2012/063
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/063,
      author = {Shahram Khazaei and Douglas Wikström},
      title = {Randomized Partial Checking Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/063},
      year = {2012},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/063}
}