Paper 2012/031
An error in "On a new formal proof model for RFID location privacy"
Da-Zhi Sun
Abstract
In Information Processing Letters 110 (2) (2009) 57-61, Deursen and Radomirović evaluated five formal RFID privacy models. One main result is that Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model is incorrect. The supporting fact is that a constant-response protocol cannot pass the test of Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model. However, we demonstrate that the constant-response protocol is artificial, and the corresponding result is therefore unwarranted. It means that Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model is not a trivial model. Hence, more effort still can be made to improve Ha et al.’s RFID privacy model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Location privacyUntraceabilityRFID protocolFormal proof model
- Contact author(s)
- sundazhi @ tju edu cn
- History
- 2012-01-29: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/031
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/031,
author = {Da-Zhi Sun},
title = {An error in "On a new formal proof model for {RFID} location privacy"},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/031},
year = {2012},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/031}
}
