Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/014

Reset Indifferentiability from Weakened Random Oracle Salvages One-pass Hash Functions

Yusuke Naito and Kazuki Yoneyama and Kazuo Ohta

Abstract: Ristenpart et al. showed that the limitation of the indifferentiability theorem of Maurer et al. which does not cover all multi stage security notions but covers only single stage security notions, defined a new concept (reset indifferentiability), and proved the reset indifferentiability theorem, which is an analogy of the indifferentiability theorem covers all security notions S: if H^U is reset indifferentiable from RO, for any security notion, a cryptosystem C is at least as secure in the U model as in the RO model. Unfortunately, they also proved the impossibility of H^U being reset indifferentiable from a RO where H is a one-pass hash function such as ChopMD and Sponge constructions. In this paper, we will propose a new proof of molular approach instead of the RO methodology, Reset Indifferentiability from Weakened Random Oracle, called as the WRO methodology, in order to ensure the security of C with H^U, salvaging ChopMD and Sponge. The concrete proof procedure of the WRO methodology is as follows: 1. Define a new concept of WRO instead of RO, 2. Prove that H^U is reset indifferentiable from a WRO, (here an example of H is ChopMD and Sponge), and 3. Prove that C is secure in the WRO model. As a result we can prove that C with H^U is secure by combining the results of Steps 2, 3, and the theorem of Ristenpart et al. Moreover, for public-key encryption (as cryptosystem C) and chosen-distribution attack we will prove that C(WRO) is secure, which implies the appropriateness of the new concept of the WRO model.

Category / Keywords: indifferentiability, reset indifferentiability, multi-stage security game

Original Publication (with major differences): ACNS2014

Date: received 9 Jan 2012, last revised 4 Jun 2014

Contact author: Naito Yusuke at ce MitsubishiElectric co jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140604:085556 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]