Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/005

A Unified Approach to Deterministic Encryption: New Constructions and a Connection to Computational Entropy

Benjamin Fuller and Adam O'Neill and Leonid Reyzin

Abstract: This paper addresses deterministic public-key encryption schemes (DE), which are designed to provide meaningful security when only source of randomness in the encryption process comes from the message itself. We propose a general construction of DE that unifies prior work and gives novel schemes. Specifically, its instantiations include:

-The first construction from any trapdoor function that has sufficiently many hardcore bits.

-The first construction that provides "bounded" multi-message security (assuming lossy trapdoor functions).

The security proofs for these schemes are enabled by three tools that are of broader interest:

- A weaker and more precise sufficient condition for semantic security on a high-entropy message distribution. Namely, we show that to establish semantic security on a distribution M of messages, it suffices to establish indistinguishability for all conditional distribution M|E, where E is an event of probability at least 1/4. (Prior work required indistinguishability on all distributions of a given entropy.)

- A result about computational entropy of conditional distributions. Namely, we show that conditioning on an event E of probability p reduces the quality of computational entropy by a factor of p and its quantity by log_2 1/p.

- A generalization of leftover hash lemma to correlated distributions.

We also extend our result about computational entropy to the average case, which is useful in reasoning about leakage-resilient cryptography: leaking \lambda bits of information reduces the quality of computational entropy by a factor of 2^\lambda and its quantity by \lambda.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Deterministic encryption, trapdoor functions, hardcore functions, computational entropy, $q$-bounded security

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-TCC-2012

Date: received 3 Jan 2012, last revised 7 Jan 2014

Contact author: bfuller at cs bu edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This paper appeared in Theory of Cryptology 2012. This version has significant new material and appears in Journal of Cryptology 2013.

Version: 20140107:203142 (All versions of this report)

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